Developmental Myopia

After spending time in development work in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and on both the civilian and military sides of the equation, the key challenge/opportunity remains the same: a lack of a long-term plan that's being executed by a near-term element in order to establish long-term success in both of those countries.
 
In the case of Iraq, the issue is easier, in some respects: albeit highly centralized and therefore lacking in initiative at the local level, there did exist in Iraq a form of government and a form of infrastructure, a means of accomplishing a great many things. Iraq has been a functional (in some respects) country for an extended period of time.
 
Afghanistan, on the other hand, while it has highly developed pockets of civilization (Herat, Kabul) that can reference a time prior to the fear and chaos of the time of the Taliban, is primarily a country of tribal groups who, while having access to cellphones, are still operating somewhere several centuries behind when it comes to localized government.
 
Which, may not be a bad thing. If history has taught us nothing else, it is this: that whenever "civilization" comes to tribal lands, trouble is soon to follow. Sure, they get modern medicine, better shelter, more efficient means of hunting, but then what?
 
This is not to say that the 7 deadly sins aren't an issue in remote locations far from civilized eyes, not by any means. Man's heart is at its nature prone to making poor choices, and thus, even the most primitive areas suffer from murder, robbery, and rape.
 
But what is often the problem is that the attempt at putting together a framework of civilization is primarily in this vein (using the British as an example): Rather than thoroughly investigating and studying the local culture to see what might work for them, and what could be improved, the assumption is made that the entire process must be re-done, and re-done in the image of the new regime.
 
British colonization of India -- they sought to put their very British stamp on the entire process, rather than trying to work within the existing structures and integrate the positives from both sides of the equation.
 
Another example: the white man moving west in the United States, and taking over the Native American cultures there.
 
Whenever they'd send the Native American kids to school, they'd cut their hair, first thing. No thought as to what the longer hair might mean to that young man, only that it was a sign of "savagery" and now that he was "civilized," haircuts all around.
 
So what prevents us from taking the time to study the existing systems and integrate it with our own, or, more radically, leave it like it is?
 
From my direct observations, there are a few reasons for this:
 
1.Arrogance: we assume automatically that because that man sitting across from us is wearing some kind of pajama-type outfit and wearing sandals, that he's ignorant, and there must be educated in the way we do things.
2.Short-term thinking: due the high rate of turnover in both civilian and military development entities, the process continues to repeat itself with every new element that arrives. Rather than continuing the previous group's efforts, a new group simply takes over and does what it thinks is right.
3.Operational mismanagement: it's a topic I harp on a lot, but having ISAF personnel locked up in secure FOB's and COP's rather than being more integrated with the people it is trying to work for creates this continued disconnect.
 
Solutions? Simple -- people need to stay here longer and be out there more often.
 
1.Military tours should be extended to 2 years. This would mean greater continuity, as well as longer dwell-times in the United States between deployments.
 
2.Military efforts should be more widely dispersed in an interlocking integrated security support system that allows them to be out in the area directly, rather than only a few hours at a time.
 
3.Civilians in the form of HTT's and other entities need to be here longer, as well. This is more difficult to accomplish, as the movement in and out of jobs is so frequent, but the intent here might be served with greater incentives by donor organizations. In other words: the longer you stay, the more we'll pay you, etc.
 
4.The integration of civilian and military efforts needs to be a more active, working process. As it stands now, it's a fairly helter-skelter approach where individual elements at the battalion and PRT levels are accomplishing tasks as they see fit, rather than supporting an overall plan.
 
5.Fewer projects, greater follow up. This would be readily served by people being here longer as well as being more engaged with the communities. Rather than trying to begin so many different projects, focus efforts in a way that will build those "spheres of influence" into larger areas of fully functional GIRoA efforts.
 
All these things take time and a shift in thinking and operations that isn't likely to happen, and this conflict will resolve in the way of all modern conflicts…at some point someone just declares we're done, and we all go home.