Yes Virginia, There is an Insurgency

In a report listed here, the Kagans (read their bios…smart people) detail how many troops will be needed in order to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Iraq, therefore achieving victory so we can all go home and sleep peacefully knowing that we did a Stewartian “good thing.”

Except that they’re wrong. I don’t argue with their figures. They’ve done their math, and if wars could be won by calculators alone, then we could train a brigade of Kagans and be done with it.

What I am contesting is their basic understanding of the situation in Afghanistan. Despite their acknowledgement that we are fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, the Kagans’ report makes two statements that almost directly contradict successful counterinsurgency activities.

The first is on page 5 of the document: “Security and governance have priority over development.” I take exception to this statement, not only from a self-serving, I-want-a-job-and-my-job-is-development standpoint, but from a doctrinal standpoint.

In COIN, there are multiple Lines of Operation, or LOOs. Security/governance is only one of the LOOs. Since an insurgent force is by its nature drawn from the local population, part of a successful COIN effort is improved local infrastructure, health care, and educational services. True, one can not build a well under fire, so we conduct kinetic operations/direct action when needed, but development does not stop, merely shifts focus.

The 2nd, and more alarming statement, is on page 18: “The issue of ‘foreign occupation’ is a propaganda theme, not a finely-calibrated reality.” Their point here is that there are not nearly enough troops in Afghanistan to truly “occupy” that country, so there is not truly an “occupation” in place.

A key component of COIN is that information operations (IO) portion of the program. If a population believes it is being occupied, it is occupied, no matter how “finely-calibrated” that belief may be. Is Santa Clause real? No. But don’t try to explain that to your 4 year old. To that kid, Santa is very real. What’s perceived is real, no matter the actual reality.

The Kagan report uses the word “counterinsurgency,” but only speaks in specific terms to “counter terror” operations, which are direct actions that do not consider the other key components of a counter-insurgency. The systemic approach they recommend is a coordination of governments, not an interaction with local tribal populations. This is an approach which will ultimately fail, ignoring as it does the basic tribal nature of the majority of the Afghan population.